The Ghost in Your Wiki: What the Confluence Axis Attacks Mean for Business

A long-retired library nobody remembered turned company wikis into a skeleton key. Here is what owners and managers should do this week.

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Ask most companies what their most sensitive system is and they will name the bank portal, the ERP or the customer database. Very few will say “the wiki”. Yet this week, the internal wiki is exactly where attackers went shopping.

On 13 November 2026, Rapid7’s managed detection team caught an intruder inside a customer’s Atlassian Confluence Data Center server. The way in was CVE-2026-90436, a critical flaw not in Confluence’s own code but in Apache Axis 1.x, a SOAP web-services library that reached end of life many years ago and that Confluence still carried for its legacy remote API. Within minutes the attacker was reading the wiki’s database. Within twelve hours they were signed in to the victim’s Microsoft 365 tenant. On 18 November, CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and gave US federal agencies until 21 November to deal with it.

This post explains, in plain language, what happened, why an old library is a business problem rather than just an IT one, and what to do in a prioritised order.

TL;DR / Key takeaways

  • It is being exploited now. CVE-2026-90436 (CVSS 9.8 per CISA; 9.3 under Atlassian’s CVSS 4.0 rating) allows unauthenticated remote code execution. Confirmed victims include Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central servers.
  • Only one setting decides exposure. Confluence Data Center 1.x to 9.x is vulnerable when “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” is turned on. Fixed in 9.2.28; Confluence 10.x removed the feature; Atlassian Cloud is not affected.
  • The wiki was the treasure map. The attacker searched pages and attachments for passwords, tokens, VPN configs, private keys and card numbers, then used a stolen service account to reach a cloud data warehouse and Microsoft 365.
  • Old code hides inside products you trust. Apache will not ship a fixed Axis 1.x. Other software that bundles it may be exposed too, and most inventories would not show it.
  • What to do: Patch or switch off the Remote API today, check for signs of compromise back to 6 November, and rotate every secret your wiki touched if anything looks wrong.

What happened, in plain language

The flaw: a forgotten engine under the hood

Apache Axis 1.x is a Java library for SOAP, an XML-based way for applications to talk to each other that was popular in the 2000s. Many products embedded it and then moved on to newer interfaces, but kept the old component around so customer integrations would not break.

According to the Apache advisory posted to the oss-security list on 6 November, Axis 1.x mishandles incoming SOAP fault messages (the format used to report errors). When a fault names a Java class, Axis loads that class and runs its constructor before checking that it is a legitimate error type. With the right class available to the application, that becomes remote code execution. Crucially, the advisory notes that faults are parsed before any per-service handlers run, so authentication on the service does not protect you.

Apache marked the issue “UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED”: Axis 1.x is end of life, and the project does not plan a fixed 1.x release. It recommends migrating to Axis 2 or another SOAP engine, or applying a published patch commit to your own build. In other words, the fix depends on every vendor that bundled the library.

How it hit Confluence

Confluence uses Axis for its XML-RPC and SOAP APIs, exposed through the “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” setting. Atlassian’s advisory (9 November) says this setting has been off by default for new installations since Confluence 3.0. But many long-running installations, especially those integrated with older scripts, reporting tools or add-ons, still have it on.

Rapid7 describes the attack chain it saw:

That last step is the business lesson. The vulnerable server was a wiki, but the damage reached the data warehouse and the email tenant, because the wiki held the keys.

Timeline

Date (2026) Event
6 Nov Apache discloses CVE-2026-90436 in Axis 1.x (end of life, no fixed release planned)
9 Nov Atlassian publishes its Confluence Data Center advisory; fix listed in 9.2.28
12 Nov Public proof-of-concept targeting N-able N-central released
13 Nov Rapid7 MDR detects exploitation of a Confluence Data Center customer; N-able reports in-the-wild N-central exploitation
16 Nov Rapid7 publishes its findings; N-able ships N-central 2026.4 HF3, which disables the Legacy API
17 Nov Rapid7 releases a Metasploit module for Confluence with the Remote API enabled
18 Nov CISA adds CVE-2026-90436 to the KEV catalog, due date 21 November

Once a Metasploit module exists, exploitation is no longer limited to skilled operators. Expect broad scanning.

Am I affected?

Confluence

N-able N-central

Anything else built on Java

Field Effect makes the point bluntly: “Most software inventories track products rather than embedded libraries, so organizations may be unaware they run it.” Older in-house Java applications, vendor appliances and middleware can all carry axis.jar or axis-1.4.jar. If your IT team or vendors cannot say whether you run Axis 1.x, that is itself an answer: you do not know.

Why this matters to the business, not just IT

1. Your wiki is a password manager you did not choose. Teams paste database connection strings into runbooks, attach VPN profiles to onboarding pages and leave API keys in “temporary” troubleshooting notes. The attacker in Rapid7’s case went straight for exactly that, and also hunted for card numbers inside attached spreadsheets. For an e-commerce business, a card number in a wiki attachment can turn a wiki breach into a payment-card compliance incident.

2. Integration accounts are the bridge to the cloud. The jump from wiki to data warehouse and Microsoft 365 happened through service and integration accounts. These accounts often have broad permissions, no MFA and old-style (“legacy”) authentication enabled, because “the integration breaks otherwise”.

3. Self-hosting means owning the patch clock. Many organisations, including plenty in Pakistan and the wider region, keep Confluence on-premises for data-residency, cost or connectivity reasons. That is a legitimate choice, but it means nobody patches it for you. CISA gave federal agencies three days. Most private firms take weeks.

4. “End of life” does not mean “gone”. Apache stopped maintaining Axis 1.x long ago, yet it was still shipping inside two widely used commercial products in 2026. Every vendor product you run is a bundle of other people’s code, and the oldest parts are often the least watched.

Your prioritised action plan

Immediate (today)

This week

Longer term

What your security team should check

These are defensive starting points drawn from the indicators and guidance published by Rapid7, Atlassian, Field Effect and Prophet Security. Adapt field names to your tools.

Web/proxy logs: SOAP requests to the vulnerable endpoint (Linux shell)

~|#| Tomcat access logs on each Confluence node (path varies by install); use reverse~|-|proxy logs if Tomcat only sees the proxy IP
grep ~|-|E 'POST [^ ]*(soap~|-|axis|/rpc/xmlrpc)' /opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/conf_access_log.*.log \
  | awk '$9 ~|=|~|=| 500' | less

Rapid7 reports every malicious POST in its case returned HTTP 500. Legitimate integrations can also produce errors, so investigate source IPs you do not recognise.

EDR/SIEM: Confluence spawning a shell (Splunk-style pseudocode)

index~|=|edr parent_process_name IN ("java","java.exe","tomcat9.exe")
  process_name IN ("sh","bash","curl","wget","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","psql","mysql")
  host IN (~|<|confluence_hosts>)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen by host, process_name, process_command_line

Baseline first: Synchrony is a legitimate Confluence child process.

Microsoft Entra ID: legacy-auth sign-ins by service accounts (KQL)

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > datetime(2026~|-|11~|-|06)
| where ClientAppUsed !in ("Browser", "Mobile Apps and Desktop clients")
| where UserPrincipalName has_any ("svc", "integration", "confluence")
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, ClientAppUsed, ResultType, AppDisplayName
| order by TimeGenerated asc

Published indicators (Rapid7), to treat as leads rather than proof:

Cloudflare Tunnel, Pinggy and webhook.site are legitimate services, so a hit means “look closer”, not “breached”.

If you find evidence of compromise: preserve memory and disk before restarting, rebuild the server from a clean source, and rotate the Confluence database password, encryption keys, Crowd/LDAP bind credentials, application link credentials and any secrets stored in pages. Revoke sessions and tokens as well as changing passwords. Then review sign-in activity across your identity, cloud and data platforms. Field Effect and Prophet Security both stress that the blast radius is wherever those stolen secrets reach.

OffensioX perspective

Two trends meet in this incident. The first is legacy code debt: the riskiest component in a modern product is often a library its own vendor forgot it was shipping, and “end of life” upstream rarely means “removed” downstream. The second is speed. A proof-of-concept appeared on 12 November, exploitation was seen on 13 November, and the attacker moved from a wiki to Microsoft 365 in half a day with tooling that Rapid7 believes was AI-assisted. Monthly patch cycles and annual access reviews were built for a slower world.

The most useful question a business leader can ask after reading this is not “are we on 9.2.28?” but “what would an attacker find if they could read our wiki for one hour?” If the honest answer includes passwords, keys or customer data, fixing that removes the payoff from the next bug, not just this one.

If you want an independent view of that answer, OffensioX runs penetration tests and security assessments that look at internal tools like Confluence, the secrets they hold and the cloud accounts they unlock, before an attacker does.

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